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Abstract   
 
 
Low carbon heat networks (LCHNs) offer great potential for carbon 
reduction and to reduce heat costs for consumers. In spite of these 
benefits, LCHNs provide for just two per cent of heat demand in the UK, 
when recent estimates suggest they have the potential to provide for 
around 43 per cent. It is within this context that the Pioneer Cities project 
(the project) was launched by the UK government, aiming to help local 
authorities overcome barriers to the deployment of LCHNs. This paper 
reports the findings of an evaluation of this project, drawing on 86 in-
depth interviews with stakeholders across five local authority areas, 
analysed using elements of Actor Network Theory (ANT). The evaluation 
found that the project's success has been limited. Participating local 
authorities have encountered common challenges regarding 
marketisation; public sector retrenchment and a lack of experience in 
mobilising LCHNs. These factors militate against the formation of the 
robust actor-networks required to drive forward LCHNs. Analysis using 
ANT reveals insights into why LCHNs remain elusive in the UK and 
suggests that policy makers seeking to promote LCHNs need to do more 
to strengthen local authorities' ability to lead and deliver complex 
infrastructure projects. 
 
Keywords: heat networks; district heating; low carbon heat networks; 
actor network theory  
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1. Introduction 
Heat networks (HNs) - systems for distributing heat generated in a centralised 
location for residential and commercial heating requirements- are an important part 
of low carbon transition plans across Europe, especially in countries pursuing 
nuclear phase-out policies (World Energy Council, 2012). They have also been 
identified by the UK government as an important part of the UK's future low carbon 
energy supply.  
Governmental commitment to HNs in the UK and elsewhere stems from a 
recognition of their potential benefits. They are well suited to densely populated 
areas and can reduce carbon emissions when deployed in these environments 
(DUKES, 2012). A further benefit is that they can be powered using a variety of fuels, 
including lower carbon sources such as biomass and energy from waste. HNs are 
also cost-effective compared to individual renewable technologies and have the 
potential to reduce energy costs for consumers (DECC, 2012a, 2012b, Poyry, 2009, 
Lund et al., 2010). Indeed, the UK Committee on Climate Change (UK CCC; 2010) 
stated that where HNs utilise low carbon fuel, they represent one of the most cost-
effective carbon abatement measures available. 
Despite these benefits, HNs of any significance are comparatively rare within the UK, 
providing for just two per cent of heat demand (DECC, 2012c), when recent 
estimates suggest that they have the ‘technical potential to supply up to 43 per cent 
of heat demand…by 2050’ (DECC, 2015a).  
There are various historical, technical, financial and organisational reasons for this 
low provision and it is within this context that the Pioneer Cities project (the project) 
was launched by the UK government in 2013, with the aim of helping to address key 
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barriers that local authorities (LAs) encounter during the early stages of HN 
development and that often prevent deployment.  
The project involved the allocation of grant funding (of between £200,000 and 
£300,000 per city) to five English cities to support the early stage planning and 
development of HNs powered by low carbon fuel sources (LCHNs). The funding 
could be used flexibly by the cities but was generally used to hire consultants to 
produce feasibility studies.  
The project was developed in recognition of the range of systemic and practical 
challenges that LAs face in developing LCHNs in the UK, as documented by 
Ambrose (2014); UK CCC (2010); DECC (2013); Heat and the City (2011) and Kelly 
and Pollitt (2010), amongst others. These sources identify four core challenges: 
1. Substantial project development costs (in addition to capital costs) including: 
feasibility studies, attracting finance, master planning and legal advice.  
2. Lack of necessary skills and expertise within LAs to deliver such projects, 
especially in the absence of established procedures.  
3. Obtaining funding to cover capital costs for the implementation of HNs, 
particularly in the context of reduced LA budgets since 2010.  
4. Little direct ownership over existing energy infrastructure. In some cases, the 
ownership and on-going responsibility for existing HNs has been transferred 
from LAs to private sector bodies.   
Each of the five participating cities was at different stages in the development of 
plans for LCHNs and had varying levels of relevant experience. For example, two of 
the cities had existing HNs that they wished to expand and de-carbonise, whereas 
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others had no history of implementing and operating them at all. The precise nature 
of the barriers faced therefore varied between cities and contexts.  
The original research objective was to develop an understanding of the extent to 
which the project helped the cities to overcome both the general and the context 
specific barriers they faced in developing LCHNs. A secondary focus was to better 
understand the processes that LAs worked through in pursuit of LCHNs.  
Key to the mobilisation of infrastructure projects, such as LCHNs, is the ability of the 
lead organisation to forge and sustain effective networks that bring together all the 
actors necessary to enable development or to at least establish its feasibility 
(Bulkeley and Kern, 2006). Identifying the actors required is a challenge in itself, and 
there is no established model for HN development, especially in the UK where there 
has been and continues to be experimentation with different organisational forms 
(Heat and the City, 2011). Once a configuration has been agreed upon, the resultant 
actor-network must find a way to work within and around the various contextual 
constraints it faces in achieving its goals (King et al. 2011).  
 
While previous research into the mobilisation of HNs has explored the processes 
involved, focussing heavily on the economic challenges (Rydin et al, 2014), there 
has been little consideration of the 'work done' within those processes to enrol key 
actors and draw them into a stable configuration or actor-network capable of 
delivering LCHNs. This paper draws on data that provides insights into the attempts 
of LAs to enrol key actors into such a network and the relationship between this and 
their effectiveness in mobilising HNs. The paper therefore contributes towards 
addressing a gap in our current understanding of the factors that can inhibit HN 
development. 
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This paper also recognises that LCHNs represent a 'double challenge' in the sense 
that HNs are challenging enough to mobilise but those that utilise low carbon 
sources are more complex still (DECC, 2013; King et al, 2011). The specific 
challenges involved in mobilising LCHNs, as socio-technological innovations, have 
received little attention in the existing literature, which predominantly considers the 
development of fossil fuel powered networks (see Hawkey et al, 2013; Williams, 
2010).  
The innovatory aspects of LCHNs in turn suggest the use of appropriate socio-
technical theoretical frameworks to contextualise the processes involved in their 
development. In this paper Actor Network Theory is applied as a framework through 
which to understand the work done in the formation of the actor-networks necessary 
to mobilise LCHNs and if appropriate, where they are falling down in pursuit of this 
goal.  
This paper comprises of six sections, including this one. The following section 
outlines the analytical framework underpinning this paper. There then follows a brief 
explanation of the methodology employed before the main findings are set out in the 
fourth section. Section five provides a discussion of the results in the context of the 
analytical framework and the paper ends with key conclusions and policy 
implications. 
 
2. Analytical framework  
 
HNs are the outcome of the construction and stabilisation of a broad collection of 
human (social) and non-human (technical) elements. As such, a key question for 
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those seeking to understand how new HNs are brought about relates to the 
processes by which these different elements are drawn together to create a new 
entity in the shape of the HN or, in this case, the LCHN. In this vein, Hawkey et al 
(2013) conceptualise HNs through allusion to actor-network theory (ANT), with 
particular reference to the need to consider “the work done to configure the 
heterogeneous components of the system with the aim of establishing a stable 
foundation for urban heat and cooling networks” (pp.23). 
 
ANT is highly relevant to HN development, being mostly concerned with 
understanding how scientists and technical experts interact with one another and 
with pressure groups and politicians. To secure change, experts have to enlist the 
support of influential groups and build supportive networks that comprise the relevant 
professions, specialists, and political actors with the potential to influence a situation. 
They also have to ensure that the non-human world behaves in a predictable and 
conducive manner (Goodchild, 2015).  
 
In order to forge an effective network, ANT contends that experts also have to 
provide reliable information and technical calculations proving the viability of their 
idea or project and to translate their positions and requirements into a language that 
the other actors can understand and appreciate as being in their best interests 
(Goodchild, 2015). In this context, Latour’s (1999) work on 'circulatory systems' can 
be used to add greater depth to our understanding of the steps that together actors 
must take to secure the change they seek: in this case, a transition from 'traditional' 
heating systems to LCHNs. Latour outlines five steps, which together form pre-
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requisites to an effective actor-network, as follows (adapted from Latour 1999 and 
Tabak, 2015):  
 Organisation of the world: the formation of arguments to support the overall 
objective, using various instruments to build a credible supporting evidence 
base. Including provision of reliable information and technical calculations. 
 Autonomisation: the position reached when actors have assembled sufficient 
evidence to support their views and are credible enough to be considered an 
'authority' on a particular matter. Once achieved, actors are in a position to 
convince others of their arguments and form 'alliances'.  
 Alliances: actors cultivate interest amongst 'powerful groups and institutions' 
and enrol them into a network. 
 Public representation: promoting public acceptance of the idea by aligning it to 
everyday practice. 
 'Links and knots': achieving all of the above activities simultaneously and in a 
joined up fashion. 
 
In the context of this paper, there is a stage hidden within Latour's framework which 
deals with the work done between the stages of organisation and autonomisation, 
involving the identification and enrolment of key actors required to make the project 
happen. In ANT, these stages are known as interessement and enrolment (Boelens, 
2010). The incorporation of these additional stages into this analytical framework 
also responds to Cressman's (2009) criticism that when ANT is used as an 
evaluative tool, there is a tendency to examine the inputs and outputs of the network 
but not the work done within it.  
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These stages of interessement and enrolment are particularly important  at the early 
stages of conceptualising and mobilising HNs, where greater levels of ‘faith’ and trust 
are required in order to make connections between actors in the absence of tangible 
or immediate rewards. This task is made harder still when the aim is to incorporate 
relatively novel forms of energy supply into new developments, as is the case in 
relation to the use of low carbon energy sources. In this scenario, the potential 
benefits of enrolling in the emergent actor-network are not only distant but poorly 
understood, as evidence relating to the economic benefits and 'pay-back' periods 
associated with low carbon fuels is inconsistent (DfT, 2012).  
 
This paper also aims to consider another factor not previously addressed in the 
literature:  the processes of translation required to make a HN project ‘legible’ for and 
attractive to different interests. This might include the development of a financial 
business case to attract investors or the identification of social benefits to secure 
public sector and institutional commitment. This signals the importance of 
considering questions of interdependency or, in other words, how key actors are 
enrolled by others to meet their own goals in this process of developing new actor-
networks. Rutland and Aylett (2008) summarises the importance of translation and 
interdependency to the formation of effective actor-networks: 
 
"If actants end up working together … it is not because of any inherent alignment 
of interests, but rather because potentially quite different interests have been 
translated: compromises have been made, and actants with diverse interests have 
been persuaded that moving toward their objectives can be best achieved by 
working with certain others." (Rutland and Aylett, 2008 p.632) 
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Heat and the City (2011) suggest that this process of translation is ongoing and 
iterative over the lifetime of a project and increases in complexity in line with the 
range of actors enrolled. 
 
The circulatory system model incorporating the concepts of interessement and 
enrolment is helpful in conveying the complexity of the process through which an 
actor network is assembled. However, one key set of issues that it does not explicitly 
recognise are the additional external pressures that act upon an actor-network as it 
emerges. In particular, it is important to recognise action at the local level as taking 
place “in the shadow of hierarchy” (Jessop, 1997). Actor-networks rarely operate in 
isolation and are likely to need to interact with and draw support from other networks 
operating at various different levels (for example, in relation to finance and technical 
matters) if they are to realise their ambitions (Rydin et al, 2007). In relation to HNs, 
there is a particular reliance on such external networks in order to secure capital 
funding.  
 
In the past LAs would have been less reliant on external networks to raise capital 
and to organise the supply of heat. During the 1950s and 60s in the UK, HNs were a 
more common source of heat within large LA housing schemes and the relationship 
between supplier and consumer was relatively simple. LAs would be responsible for 
the production and supply of heat and consumers charged a fixed price for heat, 
regardless of consumption (DECC, 2014). Now the context is changed. Geographic 
consolidation, nationalisation and then later liberalisation of energy markets removed 
LA control over energy systems and their potential role in LCHNs constrained by 
11 
 
state aid and procurement rules (Heat and the City, 2011). These constraints are 
illustrated by the existing evidence on urban energy restructuring which highlights 
how LAs are being empowered but concurrently disempowered to act on energy 
infrastructure and carbon reduction (see Hodson and Marvin, 2013; Buck and While, 
2015, Bale et al., 2013). Other constraints include budget cuts and austerity (which 
have reduced LAs in size and resource); national policy uncertainty (which restricts 
long term strategic planning) and a lack of skills and experience in undertaking 
commercial projects.   
 
LAs attempting to deploy LCHNs also face added hurdles in relation to the market for 
low carbon heat provision, in particular the potential of low carbon fuel sources to 
compete with the cost and convenience of gas, especially since the removal of 
subsidies and incentives for renewable energy (DECC, 2015b). Subsidy remains 
essential, at least in the short term, because consumers will demand concessions to 
mitigate the perceived risks associated with such an unfamiliar arrangement (Poyry, 
2009). 
 
There are also questions regarding the level of profit that LAs and investors would 
find acceptable and expectations regarding the timescales in which networks should 
become profitable. A HN may be rendered inviable if expectations of profit are too 
high (or too distant in time) to enable pricing competitive with gas (Poyry, 2009). 
Returns on investment from HNs tend to be more gradual (which may not appeal to 
investors) and therefore require long term interdependencies between consumer and 
supplier (which may not appeal to the consumer) (King and Shaw, 2010). Hence, 
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there are a great many economic challenges facing the actor-networks charged with 
driving forward LCHNs.  
 
ANT takes account of economic dilemmas such as these through the concept of 
economisation, of which marketisation (or the establishment of markets) is one form 
(Caliskan and Callon, 2010). Caliskan and Callon (2010) convey the challenges that 
marketisation pose for actor-networks through their conceptualisation of markets as 
a space of confrontation and power struggles where "multiple contradictory 
definitions and valuations of goods as well as agents oppose one another until the 
terms of the transaction are peacefully determined by pricing mechanisms." (pp.4). In 
relation to a LCHN based in the UK, the pricing mechanism will be determined by the 
imperative to keep heat costs below those of gas.  Part of the consideration here for 
prospective customers will be the 'opportunity costs' of joining a network and the 
subsequent technical and practical costs and implications. The choice facing 
consumers is therefore not a simple price comparison between their current and 
potential heat costs; they must also consider whether, in light of the economic 
constraints outlined, it is worth their while.   
 
These factors means that LAs are operating in a constrained environment and are 
not well positioned to take the kind of commercial risks outlined above. However, in 
spite of these disadvantages, the UK government continues to charge LAs with the 
task of driving forward various energy and infrastructure initiatives, usually as part of 
small scale experiments or short term projects rarely linked to larger scale 
programmes.  
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The preceding discussion suggests that, as argued by Cressman (2009), ANT is a 
suitable tool for enabling deeper analysis and evaluation of actor- networks. The 
analytical framework used within this paper to frame and interpret the data will 
comprise of a combination of Latour's circulatory system and broader elements of 
ANT, such as the concepts of interessement, enrolment and marketisation. While the 
circulatory system deals primarily with the stages involved in the formation of an 
actor-network, interessement and enrolment provide more detailed insights into the 
initial recruitment of key actors, and marketisation accommodates the economic 
issues bound up with the mobilisation of LCHNs.  
 
The remainder of this paper will focus on the exploration of the following themes 
through the data:  
 
 What are the key challenges faced by LAs when attempting to mobilise 
LCHNs?  
 What is the role of actor-networks in the mobilisation of LCHNs? 
 How have LAs approached the task of mobilising actor-networks capable of 
deploying LCHNs? 
 Are LAs best placed to mobilise actor networks for the deployment of LCHNs?  
 How useful and effective is ANT as a way of understanding the mobilisation of 
LCHNs? 
 
3. Methods 
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A total of 86 in-depth interviews were conducted with key 'stakeholders' in each of 
the five cities and those who has developed and managed the project within central 
government. Interviews were undertaken over three rounds between 2013 and 2014 
to track progress towards implementation. Each city was treated as a case study, 
enabling a detailed understanding of the local context in which it was delivered.   
 
The research followed the principles of ANT in drawing on the techniques associated 
with case study research (Tatnall, 2000, p. 80). The aim was to follow the lead of 
Tabak (2015) and use in-depth interviews to track the experiences of the actors as 
they attempted to assemble a network, prompting them to reflect on the process at 
critical points.  As is usually the case in ANT, the 'network builders' (in this case the 
lead officers or 'project manager' within the LAs) were the starting point and it was 
through their eyes that the process of network construction was followed (Cressman, 
2009). However, to ensure a rounded account was achieved, the views and 
perceptions of these network leaders were juxtaposed with those of the critical actors 
that they sought to engage.  
The lead officers led us to the other critical actors within each city, who typically 
included some mixture of: 
 project manager 
 strategic lead (senior officer with overall responsibility for the project) 
 politicians (elected councillors) 
 key LA stakeholders - for instance procurement officers, planning officers or 
sustainability/energy officers 
 potential customers of the network  
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 consultants engaged to carry out technical or financial feasibility / business 
case development 
 suppliers of heat to the network  
 
Although the focus of discussion varied between the different stakeholders, the 
following themes were explored at each stage of the research: stakeholder 
engagement; project governance; engendering and maintaining political support; 
drivers of and barriers to progress; progress towards low carbon fuel sources; 
progress towards deployment and practical considerations; pricing models.  
 
All interviews were professionally transcribed verbatim and the data coded 
geographically and thematically using Nvivo 10 software. The former involved 
looking in detail at the experiences of individual cities as detailed case studies; the 
latter involved comparing and contrasting data across the five cities, enabling the 
research team to explain differences in outcomes.  
 
4. Findings  
 
4.1 Making the case for heat networks 
 
The first challenge facing LAs was to make the case for the deployment of LCHNs 
locally. Prior to taking part in the project, all the cities held ambitions for either the 
development of new HNs or the extension of existing ones and knew broadly where 
they wanted to locate them. However, reflecting the observations of Latour (1999), 
the LAs were aware that an aspiration alone was not sufficient and that they would 
need to establish them as a 'positive modality' (or an accepted idea) in order to 
further their ambitions for HN development. Latour (1999) contends that a positive 
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modality can be constructed by developing a narrative that it is difficult for others to 
unpick or challenge. An important mechanism for this can be establishing a body of 
evidence from credible sources in support of your cause.  Reflecting this, four of the 
five cities were aware of the need to enlist experts to help them make a clear 
business case for HN development and understood that, in isolation, their assertions 
would lack credibility (amongst both the public and investors). 
"I don't think anybody should underestimate the power of the fact that it's 
independent. Partners are a bit sceptical because it's us trying to sell 
something, whereas in this case we're trying to broker a contract for the 
project, but the work's been done by people independent of the LA. I think 
the fact that you've brought in people who are independent and know the 
market, it gives it that sense of professionalism, but it gives it that stamp 
of authority as well to say it's not just a couple of people sitting in the Civic 
Centre who've dreamt this up. "(Project sponsor, case study #2) 
Four of the five LAs therefore commissioned consultants to provide an assessment 
of the technical and economic feasibility of their proposals. The fifth city chose to 
conduct this feasibility work internally to conserve resources.   
Further reflecting Latour's (1999) observations, consultants across the four cities 
employed a common set of instruments to give form to the concept of a HN, build an 
argument for its viability and create an image of HNs that engenders political and 
public support. These instruments included heat mapping (to identify clusters of heat 
demand); techno-economic assessments (establishing technical and financial 
viability to enable shortlisting of possible HNs) and characterisation (more detailed 
assessment of the feasibility of short listed schemes) and were 'layered up' to form 
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the building blocks of the case for HNs. However, as Latour reminds us, the 
instruments themselves also require sufficient modality for a robust and credible 
case to be made, thus underlining the importance of appointing specialists with 
sufficient cognitive authority (Wilson, 1983). Because only these specialists have 
command of the instruments that they themselves have established as being the 
most valid and credible means of assessing viability, they establish themselves as 
'gatekeepers to the field' (Tabak, 2015). In this sense, such consultants have 
achieved the state of autonomisation, described by Latour as "the way in which a 
discipline, a profession, a clique or an 'invisible college' becomes independent and 
forms its own criteria of evaluation and relevance" (Latour, 1999 p.102). LAs 
therefore have little choice but to delegate responsibility for this task to consultants.  
 
4.2 Identifying and engaging with key actors  
Once autonomisation is achieved the next challenge is to cultivate interest amongst 
'powerful groups and institutions' or 'allies' (Tabak, 2015). In most of the cities, efforts 
to identify and enlist the support of such groups and institutions, which may also be 
described as 'key stakeholders' (external to the LA), had been limited prior to the 
beginning of the project. In most cases it was left to the consultants, with some input 
from the LAs, to identify who they needed to speak to and lead on initial 
interessement. LAs believed that consultants, as the 'cognitive authority' were better 
positioned to cultivate interest and speak the language of 'business'.  
In order to obtain the energy data required to assess viability, consultants focussed 
on identifying and approaching the potential customers of the proposed new or 
extended network(s) and, where applicable, organisations who might be able the 
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heat. Their aim, initially, was to focus on potential consumers with higher levels of 
heat demand, including public sector and larger commercial organisations who had 
been identified through heat mapping and could provide an 'anchor load' for the 
network. Concurrently, LAs worked internally to enlist the support of local politicians 
and senior managers within their organisation, who would need to sanction plans to 
emerge from the project.   
As feasibility investigations progressed, it became necessary to engage a broader 
range of stakeholders including infrastructure owners and operators, land owners 
and later, investors/financiers (although the research ended before this stage). Each 
type of stakeholder brought its own challenges in terms of interessement and 
enrolment and also dissidence.  
There was no doubt that the LAs themselves would lead the actor-networks. This 
might be seen as surprising given the LAs acceptance that they did not represent a 
credible authority in relation to HNs, sitting outside the 'invisible college'. And, whilst 
it is true that LAs have traditionally driven municipal HN development, this is no 
longer an inevitability. Nevertheless, LAs were perceived by government to be the 
right organisations to lead the projects due to their (supposed) authority over 
planning, local knowledge, social and environmental aims, ability to appeal to a 
range of actors and to act as an 'honest broker' (Heat and the City, 2011; Wedawatta 
and Ingirige, 2014; Pielke, 2007). For these reasons, it is argued by Heat and the 
City (2011) that LAs do need to participate in actor-networks aiming to develop HNs 
but are not necessarily best placed to lead them, and that different organisational 
arrangements may be required at different points in the project development cycle.  
4.3 Challenges in the interessement of external stakeholders 
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The process of interessement proved to be challenging, reflecting Latour's view that 
the creation of allies involves an 'enormous labour of persuasion and liaison' (1999, 
p.104). LAs often lacked relationships with local businesses, which meant that 
consultants were 'going in cold' and trying to establish contact and build trust with 
decision makers. This was further complicated by the fact that in larger private 
organisations, decisions about the purchase of energy tend to be made centrally, 
often as part of bulk contracts. One LA officer (in case study #3) expressed the belief 
that medium-sized organisations were amongst the easiest to enrol because, for 
them, HNs made more commercial sense than they may do for smaller and larger 
organisations. Such organisations, it was reported, tend to experience large energy 
bills but do not benefit from bulk buying. Smaller organisations, he argued, were not 
as heavily affected by high energy costs due to relatively low usage, so the upfront 
costs of connecting to a HN would be difficult to justify. 
Although LAs tended to have established relationships with other large public sector 
organisations, including healthcare trusts, colleges and universities, these 
organisations needed to be persuaded about the benefits of switching from their 
existing heat source. Issues of marketisation were prominent once again because 
the price of heat generated from HNs was often estimated to be similar to or more 
expensive than gas and it was therefore necessary to highlight the other benefits of 
HNs, such as energy security and carbon savings. Although carbon savings were an 
attractive to organisations with carbon reduction targets to meet, many already had 
long-term energy contracts or had invested in their own energy generation. While 
they were generally happy to express an interest in principle, most potential 
customers were reluctant to make a firm commitment to connecting to a HN until 
exact prices and contract terms had been fixed, and they had confidence that the 
20 
 
network would be built. This created a ‘catch-22’ situation, whereby LAs and other 
investors were unlikely to progress with building a HN before there was a firm 
commitment from customers.  
"It's chicken and egg because we're not going to get a network until somebody signs 
up to one, they're not going to sign up to a heat network until there's a heat network, 
and that is common across any heat network you choose to develop." (Consultant, 
case study #3) 
 
Consultants were keen to highlight the difficulties experienced in relation to the 
interessement of 'allies' or potential customers, recounting how organisations were 
reluctant to share information and sceptical about the benefits of connecting to a HN. 
In some cities these difficulties were exacerbated by HNs having a reputation as 
being unreliable, but also because of a political landscape in which previously 
adversarial relationships continued to affect attitudes towards collaboration. 
Reputational issues can be critical to the public acceptance of an idea; or the 
creation of a positive modality. Tabak (2015) underlines this point in his discussion of 
Latour, stating that ideas must be relatable to people's 'everyday practice and their 
systems of belief and opinions' (p.105). Consultants faced the 'double whammy' of 
trying to engage potential customers in an initiative spearheaded by the LA, which 
may not be trusted or viewed as a credible business partner, and that utilises a form 
of heating that has suffered reputational damage in the past, is unfamiliar to most 
and perceived as inherently risky (Heat and the City, 2011). Negotiations between 
potential customers and key actors will therefore be protracted and iterative (Heat 
and the City, 2011
21 
 
Commercial sensitivities also played a part and some organisations were reluctant to 
release data to a third party. Other consultants recounted the more practical 
constraints, for instance: buildings with electrical heating systems and historic 
buildings, making retrofitting a connection costly and some potential consumers 
could not make the decision to connect to a network, because they were tenants in a 
building owned by someone else.   
4.4 Challenges in the interessement of internal stakeholders 
Mobilising HNs also involves the interessement of actors within LAs. At a strategic 
level, the support of senior managers and local politicians was required, without 
which progress would be impossible. This ‘high level' support was galvanised by the 
opportunities the project afforded to deliver against strategic commitments to low 
carbon heat solutions and by the funding for feasibility studies provided by central 
government. There were, however, instances where local contextual factors made it 
challenging to engender and maintain this support. For example, organisational and 
political flux in one city made it difficult to maintain focus on the feasibility work, 
despite support from senior officers: 
“The [senior manager] left in May and then we went into a black hole while 
all that was playing out and it's taken me all this time to get some 
enthusiasm back for it because of everything else that's going on.” 
(Project lead, case study #2) 
Elsewhere (in case study 5) dwindling resources, loss of key personnel and changes 
in senior management resulted in delays and a loss of direction.  
The second aspect of internal engagement involved the interessement of 
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departments within LAs. HN development cuts across a wide range of different 
departmental 'silos', including property management, waste management, finance, 
legal, regeneration and planning. However, securing the support of these 
departments often proved challenging given their competing priorities. For instance, 
ensuring that a HN links in with and benefits from future urban development means 
adopting a ‘joined up’ approach with regeneration and planning departments, making 
HN connections mandatory for new developments in particular locations. However, 
those responsible for encouraging new development may see this as undermining 
efforts to attract inward investment into the city because potential developers may be 
deterred by the policy. These challenges were prominent in the account of a senior 
LA manager in case study 3, who recounted how:  
“… getting the buy-in politically was no problem, getting the buy-in from 
other departments has been quite frustrating and often the project's only 
been able to progress at the pace of the slowest person who also has a 
million other things to do."  
Such difficulties were also attributed to the fact that the mobilisation of HNs involves 
a degree of cultural change within authorities, requiring officers and elected 
members to think more commercially and see the LA in the unfamiliar role of energy 
provider.  
 
4.5 Enrolment and autonomisation  
As a consequence of these challenges, only one participating LA successfully 
enrolled all of the actors that they needed into an actor-network, ostensibly as a 
result of efforts over a number of years preceding the project. The others had 
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assembled 'loose networks', where key actors had agreed to take part in the project 
in principle but remained tentative in their commitment. One example of this 
reluctance to fully enrol can be found in case study 2, where a critical actor- a major 
civic institution generating waste heat that the LA envisaged would supply the 
network- avoided committing to the project whilst they explored ways of selling their 
heat directly to potential customers in the vicinity, thus displaying dissidence and 
attempting to bypass the LA altogether. This particular example highlights difficulties 
in relation to mobilisation and the nomination of LAs as network leaders and raises 
questions regarding the extent to which they necessarily represent the interests of 
and have the trust of their 'constituents'.  This narrative points to the difficulties for 
LAs in autonomising on energy matters and an associated challenge to craft the 
cognitive authority that is arguably a prerequisite of network leaders.  
 
The LA's leadership of these projects was questioned in three of the cities and LAs 
widely reported difficulties of securing support from private sector actors, in particular.  
In case study 5 such difficulties ultimately led to the collapse of plans developed 
through the project, forcing the LA to focus on an existing development led by a 
public-private partnership- an altogether 'softer' target to convince of the merits of 
HNs. This example illustrates that certain actors will always be more critical to the 
success of projects than others the dissidence of these actors can be detrimental to 
a network.  
 
4.6 Utilising low carbon sources  
As outlined previously, participating cities were grappling with a double innovation by 
trying to introduce not only an unusual form of heating but one powered by low 
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carbon sources. The cities were all driven to utilise low carbon sources, primarily due 
to strategic carbon reduction commitments.  
 
"Driving progress, we've got strategies, we've got a carbon target and we have the 
ability and the will to decarbonise our heat generation" (LA officer, case study 4). 
 
In three of the cities there was also evidence of pressure from civic actors 
(universities, colleges and hospitals) to ensure that their heat was generated from 
low carbon sources to help them achieve carbon reduction targets. As previously 
outlined, these organisations were critical players- as either major customers or 
suppliers of the network- and tensions were evident between them and those 
representing private sector or residential customers' interests for whom securing the 
lowest prices was a higher priority. 
 
“The council's listening to the customers, so what we were hearing was they want 
lower carbon heat because the higher education sector's now got carbon targets 
which they are seeking to hit, so the drivers in that sector were greater than perhaps 
the drivers in other commercial and residential sectors and that's been quite 
important.” (LA officer, case study #3) 
 
Indeed, across the cities it was conceded that heat costs remained the key factor 
determining whether a potential customer was likely to connect to the network.  
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"These projects […] offer lower cost energy and energy security to businesses and 
homes in the region. They’re probably the key drivers over the low carbon drivers, 
although they are important as well." (Senior Manager, case study 1) 
 
Consequently, despite commitments to the principle of low carbon sources in all of 
the cities, three of the cities proposed (at least in the short to medium term) to fuel 
their networks using gas. In these cases, the cities were relying on the increased 
efficiency of energy supply through the economies of scale derived from a HN to 
deliver carbon savings, as opposed to the use of low carbon sources.  
 
Of the available options for low carbon sources, energy from waste was the most 
popular and was either being used in existing networks, or being considered for new 
networks in four of the five cities. However, energy from waste plants were reported 
by their operators to be strategically and financially viable without the inclusion of 
heat generation: they provided a means of waste disposal for LAs and additional 
income through electricity generation for the plant operator. HNs were a secondary 
consideration and the key issue was ensuring that the plant operator did not suffer 
financial loss as a result of the costs of connecting the plant to a HN. It could not 
always be assumed that the operators of energy from waste plants would agree to 
supply a HN.  
 
There is evidence in these accounts of LCHNs struggling to compete with the low 
gas prices available in the UK and the relative simplicity of installing gas based 
systems. Overall, therefore, the scope for the delivery of LCHNs appeared limited, at 
least in the short to medium term. 
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4.7 Constrained actor-networks  
 
The challenges that LAs had encountered, in introducing low carbon sources to 
projects, serve as a reminder that the nascent networks were not operating in 
isolation and that there were many external pressures and contextual factors acting 
upon them.  
 
Common challenges included dwindling resources resulting from severe budget 
reductions imposed by central government since 2010. This meant the loss of key 
staff and an associated loss of knowledge, skills and connections. LA actors felt that 
they did not possess the levels of resources and influence necessary to drive 
forward large infrastructure projects.  In several cases, it was clear that LAs lacked 
the 'bargaining power' over other actors. In one city, the LA had, for financial reasons,  
signed over control of their HNs to a private company on a long lease and felt 
frustrated that they no longer had the power to drive forward its expansion. In 
another, the main heat supplier saw no reason to involve the LA in the network, 
viewing them as a 'middle man'. 
 
5. Discussion 
The previous section provided insights into challenges encountered by LAs when 
mobilising LCHNs. It is evident that, in most cases, the cities struggled to progress 
the deployment of LCHNs. 
 
Different challenges were manifest at different stages of network formation. At the 
beginning of the process, LAs did not possess the skills to produce a robust 
27 
 
technical and economic case for LCHNs (Latour's 'organisation of the world'), 
deferring attempts to create a positive modality to the consultants that sit within the 
'invisible college'.  However, even supported by ostensibly credible consultants, 
cities struggled with the interessement of local actors in the absence of immediate 
and compelling incentives. The interessement of internal stakeholders appeared 
easier as they were more driven by environmental and societal goals around carbon 
reduction, as opposed to exclusively commercial considerations.   
 
Given these difficulties, the task of enrolling key actors into an actor-network proved 
difficult and resulted in a series of 'loose' networks of wavering actors unwilling to 
firmly commit before a clear financial proposition was made. This low level of 
commitment increased the likelihood of acts of dissidence amongst key actors, with 
potential to further destabilise emergent actor-networks. These issues were 
exacerbated by the inability of LAs to achieve 'autonomisation' and establish 
themselves as a cognitive authority in relation to LCHNs.  Yet, despite their lack of 
credibility as network leaders, they continued to attempt to fulfil this role, exercising 
the mandate given to them by central government.  
 
Incorporating low carbon sources into plans for new HNs proved equally challenging 
for LAs and their consultants, who struggled to develop proposals that could 
compete with the low cost and convenience of gas. In addition, broader constraints 
were bearing down hard on LAs, depleting their resources, power and influence. 
Despite their apparent advantages and greater levels of credibility, consultants also 
struggled to persuade key actors to enrol fully, suggesting that 'public representation' 
(widespread acceptance of LCHNs) remained a distant prospect.  
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A central challenge here relates to translation, which both Latour (1999) and Rutland 
and Aylett (2013) suggest is common, whereby network leaders are unable to 
translate their vision and potential benefits to other key actors in a way they can all 
appreciate as being in their best interests. Where translation is successfully 
undertaken, public representation follows more easily. In particular, LAs struggled to 
effectively ‘pacify’ (Caliskan and Callon, 2010) the HN as a market object within 
established, obdurate market and infrastructural arrangements. HNs are a disruptive 
local innovation. Network-builders therefore face difficulties in economising their 
projects: turning it from an innovative to conventional project in order to make it part 
of established market arrangements, as well as material energy and urban 
infrastructures (Rydin et al, 2015). Important factors in establishing a pacified market 
object include standardisation and price-setting (Caliskan and Callon, 2010). 
Caliskan and Callon (ibid. p.7) note that actor-networks are more stable when “… a 
commodity has undergone specific processes of standardization that transform it into 
an entity described in both abstract and precise terms, certified and guaranteed by a 
series of textual and material devices”. Using consultants to produce positive 
modalities through techno-economic calculations and feasibility studies was an 
attempt to do this, but there was no standard approach to HNs as market objects – 
indeed, each city was approaching it in different ways and were often uncertain 
about how best to proceed. The chief means of stabilisation, and in turn, price-
setting was through reference to mainstream gas markets. This was problematic 
because potential customers struggled to see beyond the transaction and 
opportunity costs of moving to (in their eyes) the uncertain, monopolistic service 
provided through a HN.  
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This led to a 'catch 22' situation where no-one made a firm commitment to the 
project in the absence of clearly defined prices, terms and payback periods. Across 
the five projects, no such resolution had been reached and potential suppliers and 
customers remained reluctant to enter into a negotiation with the LA and their 
consultants. If potential customers had been dissatisfied with their current heat 
supply arrangements, they may have been more willing to engage on a more 
speculative basis. The push factors – such as the price or reliability of existing 
services – were insufficient to outweigh the costs associated with moving away from 
the status quo. These unfavourable conditions suggest that LAs had arguably been 
set an impossible task, in so far as the socio-technical systems for the provision of 
heat (gas boilers) are too firmly embedded and aspirations for moving away from 
them are undermined by their relative affordability. We might therefore posit that the 
failure of the cities to secure progress towards LCHNs had at least as much to do 
with issues of marketisation and the supremacy of the existing gas infrastructure 
than network leadership.  
 
Government maintains that there are considerable benefits associated with LCHNs, 
including reductions in carbon emissions and costs. However, the conditions are not 
currently right for the innovation (or double innovation) of LCHNs to break into the 
mainstream, particularly as the UK government wavers on their commitment to 
carbon reduction and scales back incentives for renewable energy (DECC, 2015b). 
  
LAs were empowered by government to attempt to roll out an innovation whose 
benefits are contested, rendering public representation very difficult to achieve. It 
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feels, therefore, that it was premature to charge LAs with the task of propagating 
LCHNs and that further work is required to 'prepare the ground' through the 
development of a supportive policy framework, incentives and enticements.  Indeed, 
if the UK government are committed to the deployment of HNs as a key means of 
decarbonising the heat supply, they will need to provide more resource to both 
enable and ease the transition.   
 
If a central problem was effectively stabilising and mobilising the concept of the 
LCHN in order to make it legible as a market object to other actors, this raises 
questions regarding the extent to which LCHNs are currently best mobilised through 
financialised, market arrangements. At least one participating city responded to this 
by introducing mandatory HN connectivity as part of planning agreements for new 
developments, thus embedding HNs as the default form of heat provision. More 
generally, if LCHNs are seen as an important tool in low carbon transitions, there is a 
need for greater market and non-market incentives for LCHN growth. This might 
include greater financial resource from central government to allow network leaders 
to proceed on the basis of social and environmental benefits, without immediate 
need to pay off the capital costs, which would potentially enable the development of 
subsidised provision that could effectively ‘compete’ with established gas networks. 
This is perhaps a simplistic solution, but in order for innovations to become 
'mainstream' there is a need to ‘nurture’ their progress. The rapid increase in the 
deployment of solar photovoltaics as a result of generous subsidy regimes in a 
number of EU states is one example of how this can work.   
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It is also important to reflect here on the extent to which it has been useful to apply 
Latour's circulatory system and other elements of ANT to the problem of LCHN 
deployment. A strength of the Circulatory System is that it encourages detailed and 
critical consideration of the process of mobilising an actor-network. In doing so, this 
paper contributes towards a notable gap in the literature around HN development, 
which has focussed heavily on economic challenges (Rydin et al, 2014), paying little 
attention to the 'work done' to enrol crucial actors. However, one lesson to emerge 
from this analysis is that the circulatory system does not enable sufficient 
interrogation of the processes of actor-network formation that play out between the 
stages of 'organisation' and 'autonomisation' involving the identification and 
enrolment of key actors. The addition to the analytical framework of Boelens' (2010) 
concepts of interessement and enrolment are valuable in elucidating these 
processes, which can be so critical to the success or otherwise of an actor-network.   
 
As emphasised in other literature, the findings suggest that economic factors are an 
important barrier to LCHN deployment. Yet it is important to set this within the 
context of the economic as a constructed, not a priori phenomenon made up of 
simple arrangements of costs, prices, supply and demand: the concept of 
marketisation allows us to interrogate these issues within the broader context of 
actor-network formation. As the data also highlights broader constraints  are acting 
upon those attempting to mobilise LCHNs, such as the retrenchment of LAs in the 
UK. Therefore, although ANT provides a useful framework for exploring the role of 
actor-networks in the mobilisation of LCHNs, its application should be accompanied 
by an appreciation of the broader factors at play. 
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6. Conclusions  
The success of the project in helping LAs to overcome key challenges encountered 
in the early stage development of LCHNs was limited. Although exact circumstances 
differ, participating LAs encountered a common set of interrelated challenges 
associated with the marketisation of LCHNs; the weakened position of LAs in the 
face of public sector retrenchment and their lack of experience in mobilising LCHNs. 
These factors militate against the formation of the robust actor-networks required to 
deploy LCHNs.   
 
But how essential are extensive actor-networks to mobilising LCHNs? The evidence 
presented here suggests that LAs could not act alone in such projects, especially not 
in a de-regulated energy market where both users and suppliers of heat freely 
choose where, how and from whom they buy and sell heat. Under these 
circumstances, LAs must become either masters of persuasion or wield impressive 
incentives. Yet, they find themselves poorly positioned to do either, undermining their 
credibility as leaders of efforts to mobilise LCHNs.  
 
In an attempt to overcome constrained resources and a lack of credibility, LAs 
enlisted consultants to broker an appropriate actor network. However, despite their 
apparent credibility, consultants also struggled to engender the commitment of key 
actors, suggesting that the incentives on offer were insufficient and the economic 
case too weak.   As such, this paper provides a clear indication that the dominance 
of the existing gas network creates a climate within which any network leader may 
struggle to engender commitment. Under these circumstances, although LAs ability 
to develop such complex infrastructure projects is being increasingly weakened, the 
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wider infrastructure and regulatory environment mean that other actors are not 
necessarily any better placed to develop LCHNs.  
 
The application of ANT to this scenario has been useful, providing a framework 
through which to identify where efforts to mobilise LCHN projects are falling down. 
Analysis conducted using different elements of ANT indicated that marketisation 
difficulties and broader economic factors undercut the ability of LAs (and their 
partners) to deploy LCHNs, making it difficult to get past the first stage of the 
circulatory system: the organisation of the world. The combined work of Latour and 
Boelens then illustrates how a failure to achieve this first stage prevents progress 
through subsequent stages, providing insights into why LCHNs remain elusive in the 
UK.   
 
7. Policy implications 
This research highlights a range of activities that policy makers (in the UK and 
elsewhere where the commitment to LCHNs exists) might usefully undertake to 
support a transition to LCHNs. They include:   
 promoting a better image for HNs and dispelling persistent myths around 
unreliability and negative environmental impacts (supporting public 
representation); 
 (re)introducing financial incentives to promote the use of low carbon fuel 
sources thus reducing the supremacy of gas and promoting the development 
of new low carbon infrastructure (aiding marketisation);  
 covering initial infrastructure costs to help overcome prohibitive' opportunity 
costs'; 
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 Supporting the development of a standardised approach to techno-economic 
appraisal of the viability of LCHNs that can be universally understood by 
investors and stakeholders, aiding transparency and enabling comparisons 
between schemes (supporting interessment and promoting standardisation).  
 
As part of this package of support, consideration would also need to be given to the 
critical question of which agency is best positioned to lead major infrastructure 
projects such as LCHNs. Acknowledgement of the possibility that such initiatives are 
best led outside of the public sector would, in turn, raise questions over how societal 
and environmental objectives associated with LCHNs would be upheld.  
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